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The ideological interests of the State and Nahdlatul Ulama in the dissolution of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

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Article Info

ABSTRACT

This article discussed the contestation of ideological interests between the state, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the case of the disbandment of HTI in 2017. The disbandment of HTI explained the existence of pro and contra groups and the attraction of ideological interests. This research was qualitative research with observation and interview methods. The research results proved that there were conflicting and conflicting interests between the interests of the state, HTI, and NU. The state interests were the interests of the Pancasila ideology and public security. NU rejected the caliphate because it was interested in defending the "Islam Nusantara" ideology. NU's success in encouraging the government was influenced by the issues' relevance and the condition of the political structure of Joko Widodo's government for the 2014-2019 period. The polarized condition of the government's political structure in the Jokowi versus Prabowo group influenced the decision to disband HTI because NU was identified with moderate Islam that supported Jokowi. Hence, NU's bargaining power with the Jokowi government was more substantial than HTI.

***Keywords**:*
Political Interest; Ideology; HTI; NU

INTRODUCTION

The development of political groups with Islamic religious backgrounds in Indonesia emerged as a new trend different from Middle Eastern countries (Abdillah, 2013; Njoto-Feillard, 2015). Muslim scholars in Indonesia have put forward the phrase "*Islam Nusantara*" to show that Indonesian Islam values tolerance and harmony between religious communities. The essence of this argument is that Islam requires cultural contextualization. This identity intersects ideologically with conservative and radical organizations, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which calls "*Islam Nusantara*" a "secularization" and "westernization" process (Njoto-Feillard, 2015). Based on this contradiction, Anwar (2009) state that Islam, such as HTI, grew because of its resistance to anti-western identity.

The identity of the HTI political group grew based on its confrontation with the west (Burhanuddin, 2016). HTI rejects western teachings because the central concept of HTI is to

build a society based on God's teachings according to the Koran and Hadith. The perspective highlighted by Hizbut-Tahrir activists is to confront God's "reason" versus human reason (Mubarak, 2008). It is what distinguishes this organization from moderate Islamic organizations such as NU. As an Islamic organization, NU has been able to find a method of tracing the law through ulama ijtihad. According to Fealy & Barton (1996) NU, which has been identified with traditional and conservative attitudes, has adapted quickly to changing times and is at the same time creative with all changes in social and political conditions. NU's attitude towards change and modernity is not always monolithic. Bush (2009) states that the majority of NU residents who are Javanese can be divided into cultural streams that stretch vertically from Jakarta to the village level, cutting through class, socio-economic, and educational differences marked by primordial loyalty to a particular cultural or ideological affiliation. The majority of Islamic mass organizations as political movement entities, use flow discourse to fight for their political agendas.

As a movement, the HTI group came face to face with the NU movement. The political attitudes and behavior of the moderate Islamic movement are formed based on considerations of *maslahah* and *mafsadah*, or profit and loss for the interests of the organization and its citizens, according to the situation and conditions (Martin, 2003). The politics played by this group is very flexible according to the decision makers' interests which are aligned with the interests of the structural *jam'iyah* and the cultural *jama'ah*. This group becomes the front line to stem radical movements such as the HTI group. Support for the decision to disband HTI is carried out consistently from the beginning to the end. Ideological differences become the basis of the movement to reject HTI's identity.

Cases of HTI competition from other political groups that resulted in the disbandment of HTI only occurred in Indonesia. Orofino (2019) who examined Hizbut-Tahrir's competition with other political groups in Western countries, explained that Hizbut-Tahrir is unique in its vision, methods, and consistency which makes Hizbut-Tahrir more acceptable in Western countries. Hizbut-Tahrir can blend in and compete with other political groups in Western countries. However, in Indonesia, the rapid development of HTI since the reform era has created problems in the conception of democracy, leading to rejection and disbandment.

The government dissolved HTI on May 8, 2017, because the caliphate ideology campaigned by HTI was contrary to the basic principles of the Indonesian state. The government explained that the activities carried out by HTI were contrary to the goals, principles, characteristics, and ideals of the state based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (Politics, Law, and Security of the Republic of Indonesia, 2017). The State Administrative Court (PTUN) trial on May 7, 2018, also defined HTI as a radical and legally deviant mass organization with a desire to uphold the caliphate system. The disbandment and definition of HTI as a banned mass organization began in 2017, while HTI has publicly declared the ideological struggle and vision of establishing a caliphate since the early 1998 reform period.

The case of the dissolution of HTI is interesting to investigate because it is political for three reasons; *first*, the act of disbanding and defining radical HTI was only carried out in 2017 during the Joko Widodo administration. Meanwhile, HTI has spread the caliphate ideology openly since 2000. The change in the state's attitude towards HTI is a sign of a change in power within the state. Changes in government regimes can bring about changes in the political power structure. *Second*, the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) on mass organizations that the government considers urgent and emergency is only devoted to disbanding HTI (Mahdi, 2017). The rule of law is a political matter. This change in the legal rules of mass organizations indicates a new interest in the political process. *Third*, the

involvement of NU mass organizations in the case of HTI's disbandment indicates that NU has a fundamental interest in HTI. NU's consistency in voicing the idea of "*Islam Nusantara*" and supporting the dissolution of HTI by the government is a sign of ideological interests.

Thus, it is interesting to discuss this issue of ideological importance. This research aimed to explain the form of interest behind the state's decision to dissolve Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia and why the *state and Nahdlatul Ulama rejected the Khilafah ideology promoted by HTI*. It related to the reasons underlying the dissolution of HTI from the government, the reasons for HTI's vision of a caliphate, and the reasons for Nahdlatul Ulama's support for the government. In addition, this research also explained the reasons for the involvement of Nahdlatul Ulama as a *pressure group* and the form of effort that Nahdlatul Ulama took to influence the decision to dissolve Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. This discussion explained Nahdlatul Ulama's actions to support Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia's disbandment.

METHOD

This research used a qualitative method with a case study approach as the analytical knife. This method emphasized the meaning aspect of a symptom, process, and social phenomenon. The meanings behind social phenomena became the research topic. Meanings with a practical value can be explored to contribute to theory, practice, and the resolution of symptoms that became social problems. This method revealed a social situation that was unique and different from the scientific mainstream. It was because this method permanently departed based on complex and exciting problems. Various social situations could be explained by this method.

This method revealed the actual situation of people's behavior, summarized in data and information from field research. Therefore, this qualitative method tended to lead to naturalistic research, namely, a method that explained a phenomenon in a natural setting (Satori & Komariah, 2010). This research data collection technique used two ways, namely; first, the observation method. Researchers carried out observations by making direct observations in the field. Researchers observed directly to the research location to see the situation and conditions that occurred in the field so that later they could obtain data related to the research problem. The second was the interview method. The interview method was obtaining information for research purposes through question and answer while face to face between the interviewer and the respondent or the person being interviewed, with or without using interview guidelines (Bungin, 2001). Researchers used interviews with actors involved in the process of disbanding HTI to obtain an overview of the basis and arguments for their interests.

Table 1. List of Research Informants

No	Informant	Position
1	Abdul Malik Mughni	Media Analyst and Youth Movement Activist Ansor
2	Achmad Dado Ekroni	Head of the Department of Public Law Materials, Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs
3	Ahmad Budi Prayoga	Government Legal Advisor in HTI Session and Member of the Pancasila Guards Advocate Forum
4	David Krisna Alka	General Secretary of Muhammadiyah Youth Center Management
5	Hizb x	Hizbut-Tahrir activists
6	Nuruzzaman	Expert Witness at the State Administrative Court and Commander of the Special Detachment 99 of Multipurpose Ansor Front *(Banser)*
7	Robikin Emhas	Chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board
8	Sri Yunanto	Expert Witness at the State Administrative Court and Expert Staff of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs

Source: processed by researchers

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The process of disbanding HTI organizations has a social and political context behind its emergence. The social context for the disbandment of HTI is the emergence of social clashes and the issue of HTI radicalism before the decision to dissolve it. The social clash started with the implementation of the Prophet Muhammad's flag *mashirah* agenda by HTI. The agenda of the Prophet's *Mashirah* was a campaign to introduce the HTI flag in black and white, which was inscribed with the *shahada*. This agenda was an annual agenda that has been routinely carried out since 2013. This event has been carried out in 34 provinces throughout Indonesia and was planned to be closed with a flag closing ceremony in the nation's capital, Jakarta, in May 2017. Social conflicts occurred when there was a disturbance in the tearing of the Rasulullah's flag. According to an interview with one of the HTI activists, Hizb x (2019), on April 28, 2017, before the peak agenda of the Prophet Muhammad's flag *mashirah*, 40,000 Banser members gathered in Jakarta to hold an apple ceremony as a match for the Prophet Muhammad's flag *mashirah* event. It was the initial cancellation of the Prophet Muhammad's flag *mashirah* event in Jakarta due to anticipation of preventing clashes and disturbances from HTI. The cancellation of the Prophet Muhammad's flag *mashirah* agenda in Jakarta culminated in social clashes from various regions that had sparked widespread public commotion.

The political context for the decision to disband HTI was a matter of the support base's interests. The large mass base of the *nahdliyin* community was the key to dissolving HTI. The government accommodated the demands and aspirations of the *nahdliyin* community and nationalist groups to dissolve HTI. According to interviews with the government (Ekroni, 2019), this political issue was a matter of choice to accommodate the choice of the interests of radical Islam or moderate Islam. The mass base of *nahdliyin* as moderate Islam was more significant and the Jokowi regime had tremendous support from this mass movement. *Nahdliyin* residents urged the disbandment of organizations that threaten state ideology, so NU asked the Jokowi government to disband HTI (Interview with Nuruzzaman, 2019). In addition, the Jokowi government also has the same political vision with a mass base of moderate nationalists and Islam. The reasons for maintaining the government's vision and performance were the reasons that surfaced in the dissolution of HTI (Muazaroh, 2019). The concentration of Jokowi was the political vision with a nationalist-democratic ideology crossed with the political vision of the *nahdliyin* group with a nationalist-religious ideology, triggering calls to protect the state ideology (Interview with Prayoga, 2019). This shared political vision has strengthened support for the HTI disbandment.

Politically, the mass base of *hizb* members was also in the circle of opposition groups. HTI is actively taking action to criticize Jokowi's government. Every Friday, this bulletin actively criticizes government policies through the Al-Islam bulletin. The development of the increasingly large *hizb* and its position as a critic made the HTI issue withdrawn as a public issue (Interview with *hizb* x, 2019). Coupled with the emergence of the issue of HTI's support for Prabowo as a political opponent of the regime, it could strengthen the political reasons for disbanding HTI. As a formal institution, HTI's position did not support Jokowi or Prabowo because Jokowi and Prabowo ran a democracy not following Hizbut-Tahrir's path and methods. HTI's institutional support was purely a political issue. Only personally, *Hizb* members had a psychological bond of support for Prabowo. Because *hizb* members considered the Jokowi administration very repressive in implementing the rules, *hizb* members have bestowed their support on the Prabowo-Sandi pair in the 2019 presidential election. One *hizb* member acknowledged it;

"Then, on the one hand, Hizb also supported in an implied way to Prabowo. He was a good person. However, support for Prabowo was not institutional, so it was only from the people. If the choice was Jokowi vs. Prabowo, I chose Prabowo. That was it. It was only implied. It was just the people. It meant supporting the people sincerely (Prabowo) was good in education, mentally, etc. It was just a form of personal support because (both partners) ran democracy (and did not have a vision of establishing a caliphate). If Jokowi, yeah, I sure that would be a bad thing" (Interview with hizb x, 2019).

The position of *Hizb* members' support for Prabowo has become an opposition political force that could threaten the existence of the Jokowi regime. The position of HTI as the opposition was used by the Prabowo-Sandi National Winning Body (BPN) to gain votes in the 2019 presidential election.

The political decision of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs to dissolve HTI resulted from a political struggle between interested groups. This decision resulted from the absorption of political aspirations from various interest groups. It was acknowledged by the Expert Staff of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, Yunanto (2019), that the government decided to dissolve HTI after absorbing the aspirations of the community and having consulted with NU, LPOI, and MUI. *"Before the disbandment, NU was invited to a meeting with Mr. Wiranto. Long before, there had been pressures to disband HTI from the media, the public, PBNU, and also Muhammadiyah. All agreed"* (Interview with Mughni, 2019). The government conducted political communication by asking for input from several religious experts and considerations and input from scholars (Interview with Alka, 2019; Mugni, 2019; Prayoga, 2019; Yunanto, 2019; Ekroni, 2019). Several NU and Muhammadiyah figures were summoned to the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs before the decision to dissolve HTI by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs Wiranto for consideration and input. The government listened to inputs from mass organizations other than HTI, especially Islamic organizations that could get input.

The decision by the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs to dissolve HTI stems from NU's insistence on the government. NU became a *pressure group* with ideological interests to dissolve HTI. Through its various autonomous bodies, this mass organization carried out political actions to dissolve HTI. These actions were considered a form of social conflict that disturbed the community. Therefore, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs responded by taking steps to disband. This mass organization supported the decision and oversaw the steps taken to dissolve HTI by the government. The decision of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs was the result of a study by ministries and government institutions that have been agreed upon by various Islamic organizations, especially NU. As a mass organization, NU always maintained relations with all groups, was respectful of the government, and provided advice to the government (Nuruzzaman, 2019).

There was also a polemic in deciding to ratify Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 2 of 2017. The discussion to ratify the Mass Organization Law in the plenary session of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR-RI) on October 24, 2017, did not reach a consensus agreement. Decision-making was carried out by taking voting votes from all seats in the DPR. The *voting* results of 398 seats received the ratification of the Perppu on Mass Organization to become the Mass Organization Law. The majority vote of members of the DPR RI resulted in the decision of the Mass Organization Law number 16 of 2017.

The constellation of the factions' political map in deciding to ratify the Mass Organization Law was clear. Political mapping of the decision to ratify the Mass Organization Law was following the polarization of Jokowi versus Prabowo in the 2019 Election. The parties supporting Jokowi's government that received the ratification of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law on mass organizations were PDIP, Golkar Party, Nasdem Party, and Hanura Party; while the PKB, PPP, and the Democratic Party accepted with a note that further improvements were discussed in the 2019-2024 period. Jokowi supported more than Prabowo supporters who rejected the ratification of the Government Regulation in Lieu of Law of Mass Organization law. The factions that rejected it were the Gerindra Party, PKS, and PAN.

Table 2. Voting results for government regulation in lieu of law of mass organization

No	Supports				Refuse	
	Accept		Receive with notes			
1	PDIP	109	Demokrat	61	Gerindra	73
2	Golkar	91	PKB	47	PAN	49
3	Nasdem	35	PPP	39	PKS	40
4	Hanura	16				
Total			398		162	

Source: processed by researchers

Institutionally, the mapping of government groups and opposition groups has been formed since the electoral contestation for the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Election. Although the conception of the Indonesian state did not recognize the term opposition, functionally, the role of the opposition was present in the dynamics of politics in Indonesia. The clarity of the position of the opposition parties made them also reject the ratification of the Mass Organization Law and the disbandment of HTI. However, the authors did not find the fact that HTI members joined the PKS, PPP, PAN, and PBB parties because they were similar to their ideology (Qohar & Hakiki, 2017).

The disbandment of HTI resulted from the ideological struggle between nationalism and transnationalism and between the ideology of moderate Islam and radical Islam. This ideological struggle was manifested in a feud between mass organizations with a religious-nationalist ideology, such as NU and the radical transnational organization HTI. The two opposing groups clashed with each other's political ideas by interpreting Islam in their way. Differences in interpretation of the teachings of Islam led to structured political clashes in various community actions. It was the root of the socio-political problem over the disbandment of HTI. In addition, political clashes did not only occur at the lower levels of society, such as demonstrations but also occurred at the level of the political elite, who were able to influence policies and political decisions. The issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Mass Organization Number 2 of 2017 was a politically charged legal product. This Government Regulation in Lieu of Law was only used as a tool to dissolve HTI organizations quickly. Based on the author's search, from the issuance of the Perppu Mass Organization in 2017 until 2019, no other mass organizations have been dissolved by the government other than HTI organizations.

The state, HTI, and NU had interrelated interests. The three institutions had their respective interests in influencing each other. In the case of the dissolution of HTI, the state represented by the government had a relationship with HTI as the object of dissolution and NU as the mass organization that supported the dissolution. HTI's vision of establishing a caliphate was contrary to the Indonesian state's goals, as stated in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, to protect the entire Indonesian nation and the entire homeland of Indonesia. The principle of Indonesian nationality, which the nation's founders

have championed, was contrary to the principle of transnationalism in the idea of a caliphate. Therefore, as the state representative, the government took steps to dissolve HTI. The government moved to dissolve HTI was also supported by NU. NU had ideological differences with HTI, resulting in the mission, interests, and pressure on the government having excellent bargaining value and power.


Figure 1. The pattern of relations between the State, HTI, and NU in the Case of HTI Disbandment

It showed that the relationship between the three institutions above resulted from a conflict of interest. Under the previous explanation, the interests of the state, HTI, and NU were ideological interests that affected different interpretations of state conditions. The state and NU interpreted the ideology brought by HTI to be inconsistent with the conditions of Indonesian nationality. On this basis, NU was pressuring the government to dissolve HTI. More comprehensively, the authors described the interests of the state and the special interests of the Jokowi government for 2014-2019, the interests of HTI, and the interests of NU as follows;

First, the state was interested in maintaining public order and maintaining the existence of the Pancasila ideology as the state ideology. This security interest was under the government's third argument regarding the reason for the disbandment of HTI that HTI activities caused community conflicts that could threaten public security and order and endanger the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Politic, Law, and Security Affairs, 2017). The social clashes between HTI and NU after implementing the Prophet Muhammad's flag *mashirah* agenda were a matter of public order and security. The social clash between HTI and NU triggered the government to make decisions to maintain social order in the community. In addition, ideological interests were why the government dissolved HTI (Interview with *hizb* x, 2019; Yunanto, 2019; Prayoga, 2019; Mughni, 2019). The dissolution of HTI was carried out to maintain the position of the state ideology, namely Pancasila, which was the consensus among the founders of the nation. HTI's ideals of establishing an Islamic caliphate and considering Pancasila as *thoghut* could destroy the

political system mutually agreed upon with a very structured movement and grew exponentially (Yunanto, 2019).

In addition, there was also a particular interest from the 2014-2019 Joko Widodo regime, which held power to dissolve HTI. It concerned the issue of the mass base of support in the general election. Politically, Joko Widodo benefited from voting support if he helped the interests of the NU group. The large mass base of the *nahdliyin* community who demanded and voiced the aspirations of the *nahdliyin* community and nationalist groups to dissolve HTI was accommodated by the Jokowi government to gain votes in the presidential election. According to an interview from the government, Ekroni (2019), this political issue was a matter of choice to accommodate the choice of the interests of radical Islam or moderate Islam. The mass base of *nahdliyin* as moderate Islam was more significant and the Jokowi regime had tremendous support from this mass movement. In addition, the Jokowi government also had the same political vision with a mass base of moderate nationalists and Islam. The concentration of Jokowi's political vision with a nationalist-democratic ideology collided with the political vision of the *nahdliyin* group with a nationalist-religious ideology, thus triggering a call to protect the state ideology (Prayoga, 2019).

Second, NU's interest in the disbandment of HTI was in the interest of the existence of a national Islamic ideology. NU made the idea of *Islam Nusantara* the actualization of Islamic values in Indonesia. NU used this idea as an effort to counter radicalism in Indonesia. With the spirit of tolerance in spreading the teachings of Islam, which was full of peace and *rahmatan lil alamin*, NU's position was opposite to the HTI position, which was considered to teach intolerant attitudes. For PBNU, HTI was a radical and anti-Pancasila organization that endangered the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and undermined the unity and integrity of the nation (Fathoni, 2017).

In addition to ideological issues, HTI's disbandment was supported by changes in political dynamics starting in 2016. Religious sentiment in Indonesia strengthened ahead of the 2017 Regional Head Election. Based on data from the Indonesian Survey Institute, the sentiment of intolerance in politics has strengthened over the last seven years. Muslims reject non-Muslim officials increased from 32.4 percent in 2010, 34.2 percent in 2011, 41.2 percent in 2016, and 49.1 percent in 2017.


RELIGIOUS SENTIMENT

■ Religious Political Intolerance ■ Intolerance of Religious Worship

	The year 2010	The year 2011	The year 2016	The year 2017
Religious Political Intolerance	32,4	34,2	41,2	49,1
Intolerance of Religious Worship	63,8	58,6	53,8	48,2

Figure 2. Religious sentiment diagram
Source: Indonesian Survey Institute, 2017

The strengthening of religious-political sentiment affected the stakeholders' political behavior in Indonesia. Based on analysis (Fernandes, 2018), religious sentiment affected the behavior and political choices of parties and presidential candidates in determining policies and political attitudes related to the presidential election. Fernandes (2018) also explained that religious and political sentiments influenced the decision to cancel the name of the vice-presidential candidate Joko Widodo from Mahfud MD to Ma'ruf Amin (Rais Am PB Nahdlatul Ulama). Furthermore, based on Prabowo's perspective, there was a need to accommodate the interests of the Muslim political elite in determining the vice-presidential candidate from the *ijtima' ulama* of GNPF (National Movement for Fatwa Guarding) MUI, which was held up to two times. This data on the strengthening of religious sentiments also influenced Joko Widodo's behavior and choice in deciding to dissolve HTI.

The government disbanded HTI to accommodate the voice of moderate Muslim populist NU, who acted as a *pressure group*. The decision to dissolve HTI came from NU's insistence on the government. NU was a pressure group with moderate Islamic ideological interests. The mass base of the *nahdliyin* group could be used to counter the political and religious sentiments of conservative Islamic groups. The existence of a populist *nahdliyin* mass that was bigger than the conservative Islamic era was more profitable for the Joko Widodo - Jusuf Kalla government to maintain the nation's ideology and practical interests in electoral politics.

The differences in the basic ideas and values of the movement became the basis for the struggle for the interests of HTI and NU. Politically, NU has played a role in articulating and aggregating interests to the government in the decision process to disband HTI organizations. The political role of NU in disbanding HTI was seen from the strategies, statements of attitude, and actions taken by NU figures in supporting the disbandment of HTI. As an Islamic organization, NU used a national political approach in which NU's position was to maintain the ideology of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia intact (Nuruzzaman, 2019). NU's national political strategy in disbanding HTI was carried out in several steps.

First, the issue of HTI was treason against the state. NU has made a political agenda by making public issues over various social conflicts in HTI activities in the regions. Through the NU youth organization, the activities of the flag of the Prophet Muhammad by HTI were forcibly disbanded in various areas such as; Tulungagung, Sidoarjo, Pasuruan, Yogyakarta, and Cilacap. The disbandment of HTI activities was carried out on the grounds of the absence of the state in creating a peaceful situation in the state. The act of disbanding without any legal process was the starting point for political instability, which was the beginning of the agenda for the constitutional disbandment of the HTI mass organization. According to an interview with Ekroni (2019), the conflict escalation between HTI and NU has led to political instability, so the government felt the need to resolve this problem.

Second, NU communicated with the government and dialogued with interest groups to support the decision to dissolve HTI. The *nahdliyin* community who demanded the disbandment of HTI responded by PBNU to communicate with the government. NU was involved in the decision-making process to disband HTI. PBNU representatives have held meetings with the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs and played an essential role in advocating for the escort of the HTI lawsuit at the State Administrative Court through one of its members in the Pancasila Guards Advocate Forum Task Force (FAPP). The daily chairman of the PBNU *Tanfidziyah* in Law, K.H. Robikin Emhas, was present at a ministerial meeting at the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs to discuss the handling of radical mass organizations in Indonesia. In addition, NU representatives in FAPP who attended the trial at the Administrative Court every Thursday from October 2017 to May 2018 contributed to the process of political communication.

Third, NU sought to reconcile the situation after deciding to disband HTI. NU expressed its support for the government's decision to disband HTI. PBNU has made statements of attitude concerning the dynamics of the disbandment of the HTI mass organization. Through the print media, NU figures spread political opinions supporting HTI's decision. The NU Media Center Movement in the making public opinion also played an essential role in making HTI. The *Mustasyar* NU network, through *kyai* and local figures, moved to disseminate positive information about the disbandment of HTI by the government. NU operated in the corridor of da'wah and disseminated information in a polite and tolerant manner because of NU's position, which had an image of itself as a community organization with an Islamic background.

In addition, the success of NU acting as a *pressure group* can be related to the analysis of the success factors of *pressure groups* developed by Almond & Powell (1988). *First*, the power of mass mobilization from NU as a *pressure group*. In the case of the disbandment of HTI, the fulcrum of the NU mass power against HTI's rejection was in the NU wing of the organization, namely *Banser*. *Banser* pressured the government by rejecting HTI activities on the agenda of the Prophet's *mashirah* flag, which was a campaign to introduce the black and white HTI flag bearing the *shahada*. The clash between *Banser* masses and HTI masses became a problem, so PBNU did not only urged but also encouraged the disbandment of HTI because HTI had caused a commotion by spreading the caliphate ideology, which threatened the ideology of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, namely Pancasila (Interview with Prayoga, 2019). In NU's view, the refusal to disband HTI carried out by the *nahdliyin* mass was not due to the institutional, instructional structure, but the rejection of the HTI *mashirah* agenda was purely ideological reasons and the movement for awareness of the national principle (Interview with Nuruzzaman, 2019; Prayoga, 2019; Mughni, 2019). NU did not organize *nahdliyin* mass to reject HTI. It proved that mass organization was not a factor that determined the success of NU working as a *pressure group*.

The second was the power of the relevance of the issue. NU brought up the issue of radicalism in its rejection of HTI. NU called HTI part of a radical Islamic organization that voiced the idea of a caliphate that endangered the ideology of the Indonesian state. Reflecting on the political conditions of Middle Eastern countries, NU described a radical Islamic movement that destroyed world peace. Radical ideas such as the caliphate have fostered anti-legitimate discourse. It made NU bring up the issue of religious radicalism to reject the disbandment of HTI. The issue of HTI radicalism had relevance to the data on the increase in religious sentiment in 2017. The strengthening of religious-political sentiment in 2017 affected the political behavior of stakeholders in Indonesia (Fernandes, 2018). The issue of Islamic radicalism was relevant to data on strengthening religious-political sentiments that affected the government's political attitude, especially the existence of the mainstream mass media, which had the same side as the government (Azzaro & Dewi, 2018; Burhan, 2017). On this basis, the issue of religious radicalism became the main force behind NU's success in pressuring the government to dissolve HTI.

The third was the condition of the government's political structure. The success factor of NU in encouraging the government to dissolve HTI was also influenced by the condition of the government's political structure. The polarization of the coalition and opposition groups in the government structure created clarity in political attitudes towards HTI. In the case of the ratification of the Mass Organization Law, the constellation of the political map of the factions in the decision-making to ratify the Mass Organization Law was clearly under the polarization of Jokowi versus Prabowo in the 2019 Election. The HTI group was identified with government critics and was in Prabowo's circle of supporters. Prasetyo (2019) stated that the HTI organization was isolated from the government's circle of power. Thus, the

decision to disband HTI was influenced by the condition of the government's political structure.

Therefore, as a *pressure group*, NU suppressed the decision to disband HTI by creating radical HTI discourses and political communication with the government. The success of NU as a *pressure group* was influenced by the relevance of the issue and the political condition of the government structure. The strategy for organizing issues and NU's position on good terms with the government was the key to NU's success as a *pressure group* that influenced the government's decision to dissolve HTI.

CONCLUSION

This research showed that the government's decision to dissolve Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia in 2017 resulted from a struggle for ideological interests between the state, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The state, HTI, and NU have conflicting, related, and mutually influencing interests. In the case of the dissolution of HTI, the state represented by the government had a relationship with HTI as the object of dissolution and NU as the mass organization that supported the dissolution. HTI's vision of establishing a caliphate was contrary to the basics of the Indonesian state. The principle of Indonesian nationality, which the nation's founders have championed, was contrary to the principle of transnationalism in the idea of a caliphate, so the government as the state representative took steps to dissolve HTI, whose decision was supported by NU. NU had ideological differences with HTI, resulting in mission, interests, and pressure on the government to have bargaining power.

The efforts made by NU as a *pressure group* to influence the government in the decision-making process to disband HTI was to demand the disbandment of HTI by making the political issue of HTI treason against the state. NU has made a political agenda by making public issues regarding various social conflicts in HTI activities in the regions. Through the NU youth organization, the activities of the flag of the Prophet Muhammad by HTI were forcibly disbanded in various regions. NU carried out the disbandment of HTI activities on the grounds of the absence of the state in creating a peaceful situation in the state. This act of disbandment served as a starting point for political instability, which was the beginning of the government's discussion of constitutionally disbanding the HTI mass organization. The escalation of the conflict between HTI and NU has led to political instability, so the government feels the need to resolve this problem.

In addition, the success of NU in encouraging the government to dissolve HTI was influenced by the relevance of the issues and the condition of the political structure of Joko Widodo's government for the 2014-2019 period. NU brought up the issue of HTI radicalism by describing the political conditions of Middle Eastern countries and radical Islamic movements that destroyed world peace. Radical ideas such as the caliphate have fostered anti-legitimate discourse. The issue of HTI radicalism was relevant to the data on the increase in religious-political sentiment in 2017. The strengthening of religious-political sentiment in 2017 had several effects on the stakeholders' political behavior in Indonesia. The issue of Islamic radicalism was relevant to the government's conclusion to decide on the disbandment of HTI. In addition, the polarized state of the government's political structure in the Jokowi versus Prabowo group also influenced NU's success in pressuring the government. The polarization of the coalition and opposition groups in the government structure created clarity in political attitudes towards HTI. In the case of the ratification of the Mass Organization Law, the constellation of the political map of the factions in the decision-making to ratify the Mass Organization Law was clearly in line with the polarization of Jokowi versus Prabowo. The HTI group was identified with government critics and was in

Prabowo's circle of supporters. Hence, the success of NU in encouraging the government to dissolve HTI was influenced by the condition of the government's political structure.

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